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Introduction
The role of …nancial systems in fostering economic growth has been explored since the beginning of the twentieth century. Schumpeter (1911) argues that …nancial intermediaries provide services that stimulate long-run growth, Goldsmith (1969) performs the …rst empirical study that shows the positive correlation between …nancial development and growth. Later, King and Levine (1993) demonstrate that "…nance matters"by testing the Schumpeterian theory: a higher level of …nancial development boosts economic growth, capital accumulation and …rms' productivity. Speci…cally, well-developed …nancial systems are found to encourage industrial growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and to promote …rms'entry in a market (Aghion et al., 2007) .
The related literature identi…es two types of …nancial systems: market-based and bank-based systems. In the former type, the investment decisions are market driven, thus resource allocation should always be e¢ cient, implying that the interest rate charged is that which prevails on the market, exactly rewarding the investor for the risk assumed. In the latter type, a cooperation between lenders and borrowers takes place: the investment decisions are based on the expected long-run capacity of …rms to repay the debt, entailing that …rms share their pro…ts with banks by paying a higher interest rate when their …nancial situation is good, in return for a lower interest rate during the start-up or …nancial distress phases. On the one hand, the lender-borrower cooperation makes sure that banks closely care about …rms; on the other hand, disregarding the market signals should lead to grant funding to …rms that are not able to create the greatest value 1 .
These brief considerations highlight the relevance of banking in stimulating economic growth. A debated issue in the specialised literature regards the e¤ects that banking market structure has on industrial growth. This paper contributes to the existing literature by shedding light on the role that banking market structure plays on the entrepreneurial initiative in Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called transition economies. Actually, competition in the banking sector a¤ects the credit supply, thus in countries where banks represent the major source of …nance, the availability of credit is fundamental for the creation of new …rms. In Central and Eastern European countries the bank-based system prevails, the credit market is concentrated and the en-trepreneurial initiative, especially in innovative, technology-based sectors, is lagging. In addition, …nancial markets are not well developed, notwithstanding their proximity to the most developed area of the European Union. Firms must rely mainly on banking credit to start their businesses; therefore, the banking market structure and the consequent quantity of credit supplied have a great importance. Furthermore, Central and Eastern European countries are passing from a planned to a market-oriented economy and are still in the process of restructuring their …nancial systems. As Bonin and Wachtel (2003) observe, before the transition process began, the only …nancial institutions were banks, mere extensions of the governments, granting funding to state-owned …rms with no risk evaluation. The transition process started in the early nineties; the banking reform concerns the creation of the Central Bank, in charge of the monetary policy, and commercial banks, initially state-owned and thereafter gradually privatised to serve the functions of modern banks 2 . For all these reasons, it might be useful for policy design to capture the e¤ect of bank concentration on the entrepreneurial initiative in this phase of changes. Several contributions explore the e¤ect of bank concentration on industrial growth on a world-wide scale, giving no emphasis to di¤erences that can occur due to the varying socio-economic and institutional context. We explicitly account for the regulatory environment and the socio-economic context, testing, among other things, what the net e¤ect of bank concentration when economies move from planned to market-oriented systems.
Moreover, on a technical level, we propose an original instrumental variable, designed to address the issue of endogeneity of banking market structure.
The reminder of the paper unfolds as follows. In the Section 2 we survey the literature; in Section 3 we present the empirical strategy and in Section 4 we provide information about data and description of variables. In Section 5 we show and discuss the empirical …ndings and, …nally, in the Section 6 we draw some tentative conclusions.
Litterature review
In the last decade, the literature has explored the relation between banking market structure and industry performance. There are mainly two theoretical approaches de-bated 3 . The traditional theory of industrial organisation provides arguments in favour of banking competition. In a competitive environment banks are price takers, minimizing costs and supplying the maximum quantity of credit at the lowest interest rate. When banks acquire market power, they become able to set prices higher than marginal cost and supply less credit. Hence, concentrated banking markets have a detrimental e¤ect on the whole industry. The alternative approach claims that the banking industry plays a role that makes it di¤erent from non-…nancial industries: among other things, banks provide …nancial services necessary for …rms to conduct their business. However, the amount of …nancial resources supplied is related not only to the market structure but also to some internal factors: a pro…table bank can provide more credit and sturdier lending relationships in the event of …nancial crises. Therefore, yielding some degree of market power with the aim to preserve banking sector stability does not necessarily have a negative e¤ect on the other industrial sectors. Taking a middle position, Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) illustrate that the banking market structure growth is the oligopoly: when the number of banks in a given market decreases, …rms are better selected and credit is granted to high-quality borrowers, even though the overall quantity of credit supplied decreases.
On the empirical side, Petersen and Rajan (1995) prove that if the credit market is concentrated, the growth opportunities of young …rms are greater. Usually young …rms are riskier and unable to sustain high interest rates. Creditors in concentrated markets are assured of sharing future pro…ts with …rms and thus accept lower interest rates in the start-up phase. However, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) , testing the e¤ect of banking market structure on industrial growth, show a general detrimental impact but, also, an industry-speci…c bene…cial impact, corroborated by Claessens and Laeven (2005) : bank concentration promotes the growth of industries more dependent on external funding and stimulates growth of younger …rms to a greater extent 4 . Deidda and Fattouh (2005) …nd out that bank concentration hurts the industrial growth of low-income countries. This negative e¤ect does not involve high-income countries, suggesting that well-developed …nancial markets, being an e¤ective alternative source of funds, exert a competitive pressure on banks.
Bonaccorsi di Patti and dell'Arriccia 2004) illustrate that …rms, especially the smaller ones, …nd barriers to obtain credit in more concentrated banking markets. However, these barriers are lower in countries characterized by less corruption and e¢ cient legal systems and disappear in countries with well-developed …nancial markets. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) support these …ndings: in order to keep their borrowers highly pro…table, banks with market power create …nancial barriers to …rms' entry. Yongjin (2008) also notes that in more concentrated banking sectors, the quantity of loans made available to small …rms falls.
With regard to banking in transition economies, Schnitzer (1999a) illustrates that banking competition fosters industrial improvement if the cost of screening …rms is not too high and, thus, pro…ts with screening are higher than pro…ts without screening. To obtain credit, …rms are induced to restructure and required to have good performances 5 . Hainz (2003) suggests that promoting banking competition is the right policy because banks with market power require higher guarantees and interest rates in order to extract rents, thus harming the social welfare. Finally, Brown and Maurer (2005) show a non-linear relation between competition among banks caused by the liberalization of the …nancial sectors and credit access for small …rms: an intermediate level of competition tends to maximize the quantity of credit, whereas too much competition becomes damaging. Further, foreign banks'entry increases the quantity of credit available for large …rms while comparatively decreasing the quantity for small …rms.
Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy follows the prevailing approach in the literature:
where index j refers to industry, k to country and " is the error term.
The dependent variable Entrepreneurship is the average annual growth rate in the number of …rms of industry j in country k for the period 2000-2007. By taking the average for the period, we remove the e¤ect of temporary shocks 6 . Industry Dummies is the set of dummies capturing the industry-speci…c e¤ects.
Bank Concentration is the average 5-Bank Concentration Ratio 7 over the period analysed, i.e. the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the …ve largest banks in each country. We allow for a nonlinear relationship between Entrepreneurship and market structure in banking, following Bonaccorsi di Patti and dell'Arriccia (2004).
Country Controls is a set of regressors at country level introduced to reduce the possibility of model mispeci…cation; we describe in greater details these variables in the next section.
Firstly, the analysis is performed using all sectors in the sample in order to point out the general impact of banking market structure on entrepreneurship. Secondly, the analysis is performed using the subsample of high-technology-intensive sectors. Actually, it is worthwhile to verify what is the speci…c impact of banking market structure on entrepreneurship in high-tech industries which are, usually, more in need on external 6 The cross-sectional estimation was conceived by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to analysis the role of …nancial markets in promoting industrial growth. Afterward, their model was revisited by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Claessens and Laeven (2005) to explore the impact of banking market structure on industrial growth, and by Bonaccorsi di Patti and dell'Ariccia (2004) to explore the impact of banking market structure on …rm creation. 7 Cetorelli and Gambera 
…nance.
Banking market structure is deemed endogenous in the related literature. Actually, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) claim that banking market structure "adjusts to a level that is optimal for a country's industrial structure". Moreover, Bonaccorsi di Patti and dell'Ariccia (2004) say that banking market structure "has an endogenous component insofar as that banks move into more dynamic economies with higher rates of …rms creation". In light of this, using the OLS estimator leads to biased coe¢ cient estimates. To deal with endogeneity of banking market structure, the 2SLS estimator is used. The set of instruments is composed by: Rule of Law and Banking Applications. The …rst one is widely adopted in the literature and measures the legislative enforcement; the second one is an original concept by the authors, de…ned as the ratio of accepted applications to applications sent to the competent authorities to exercise banking activity in 2000. 2000 is used on the assumption that entering the market today produces its e¤ect in the following years since, after entry, banks need time to perform their functions to the fullest. This instrument is meaningful: it captures entry into the banking market but it is not simultaneously determined with the dependent variables since the necessary legal requirements to operate as a bank are settled on by authorities in each country and, once de…ned, are stable and cannot be in ‡uenced by the growth rate in the number of …rms. We compute the instruments according to the endogenous variables, thus introducing Rule of Law 2 and Banking Applications 2 :
Data and variables description
Data on number of …rms come from Structural Business Statistics (SBS) developed by Eurostat and are classi…ed according to the Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE) Rev. 1.1. Data are available for the following Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia and for the following sectors: Mining and quarrying (C); Manufacturing (D); Electricity, gas and water supply (E); Construction (F); Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods (G); Hotels and restaurants (H); Transport, storage and communication (I); Real estate, renting and business activities (K).
Previous contributions focus their analysis on manufacturing, whereas we extend the analysis to other sectors whose data are available in SBS. We use data from 1999 to 2007 in order to compute the 2000-2007 average growth rate in number of …rms. Data on industries at 3-digit level of disaggregation are, mainly, used. However, if observations are missing at this level, we move to the 2-digit level, less disaggregated. We end up with 1439 country-industry observations. Following Eurostat, high-technology-intensive sectors are those identi…ed by codes 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, Table 1 ). A summary description of all the variables included in the analysis together with the indication of the sources follows: Finally, descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 : 
Results
In Table 3 are reported either estimates of all sectors or estimates of high-tech sectors. Bank Concentration has a positive and highly signi…cant impact on entrepreneurship, while the Bank Concentration 2 has a negative and highly signi…cant impact, with robust coe¢ cient estimates across regressions. The relationship between concentration in the banking sector and entrepreneurship in Central and Eastern European countries appears to be non-monotonic: bank concentration promotes entrepreneurship but too great a concentration hinders it 8 . Banks in Central and Easter European countries seem to be more willing to …nance start-up …rms when bank concentration increases. As Petersen and Rajan (1995) claim, start-up …rms are risky and not able to pay high interest rates to obtain the credit needed to undertake their business. In more concentrated markets, banks are more likely to …nance start-up …rms and to accept, at …rst, lower returns because the market power allows them easily to extract future pro…ts from successful …rms, thus being rewarded later for the risk assumed. Moreover, the market power gives incentive to banks to engage in a more accurate screening activity because the returns of new …nanced projects have a straight impact on their future pro…ts (see Cetorelli and Gambera (2000) ). Therefore, credit should be allocated to that …rms able to create the greatest value.
However, it is worthwhile noting that coe¢ cients of banking market structure in regressions using the subsample of high-tech sectors are, roughly, one third of coe¢ cients obtained from regressions considering the whole sample of industrial sectors. As said, banks tend to grant credit to projects that could have higher future returns. It is well known that investing in high-technological industries is riskier and requires a greater funding. Generally, banks are reluctant in investing is such projects, in particular when concerning small …rms (World Bank (2005) ). As a consequence, the positive e¤ect of concentration in the banking sector softens for high-tech industries.
We estimate that the maximum value of 5-Bank Concentration ratio that still promote …rm creation is 0.57 to 0.76 for regressions using the whole sample of industrial sectors and 0.53 to 0.83 for regressions using the subsample of high-tech sectors. The …ve largest banks should hold, all together, a market share up to these values, otherwise concentration becomes harmful for entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the maximum value of 5-Bank Concentration ratio still promoting entrepreneurship falls down in regressions with Activity Restriction that captures the e¤ect of banking sector regulation on entrepreneurship.
These results recall the arguments put forth by Rajan and Zingales (2001), concerning the relationship between …nancial systems and industrial growth. Concentrated banking markets, which provide the bulk of funding to …rms, work better when economies are at an early stage of development and, more generally, with traditional industries whose characteristics are well known and for which disregarding market signals might not have serious implications. In other words, more concentrated banking markets are suitable for …nancing physical-asset-intensive industry rather than hightechnology, R&D-based industries. Generally physical-asset-intensive industries are traditional and well known, so the absence of market signals about their pro…tability does not cause problems in terms of investment decisions. When industries are intangible assets-based there is the need to improve transparency, thus bank-based systems should become more competitive and, therefore, market-oriented.
Control variables have the expected signs. Log(GDP) is negative and signi…cant, capturing the convergence among transition economies. Initial Share of Industry is negative, new …rms are less likely to enter in crowded industries, although not statistically di¤erent from zero. Financial Development has positive and signi…cant e¤ects, underlying that well developed …nancial markets boost the creation of new …rms 9 . Government E¤ectiveness has a positive and signi…cant impact, suggesting that high quality governments stimulate entrepreneurship. Activity Restriction has a positive and sig-ni…cant impact on …rms creations: the lower the activities'diversi…cation, the greater the amount of credit that banks can address to traditional banking activity. Moreover, Control of Corruption has a positive and signi…cant impact, meaning that when governments enforce this control, they stimulate the …rm creation process. The variable Property Rights is positive and signi…cant: more e¤ective property rights protection fosters entrepreneurship.
The coe¢ cient estimates appear be robust to the inclusion of banking capital structure variables in the speci…cation, as shown in Table 4 10 . 9 Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998) who showed that the growth in the number of establishments is fostered when …nancial markets are well developed. 10 We include in the set of endogenous variables also the banking capital structure variables since they are built on banking assets as banking market structure variables. Although not signi…cant in regressions over the whole sample, Government-Owned Banks appears to have a positive and highly signi…cant impact in regressions using the high-tech subsample. It follows that the higher the fraction of banking assets that are 50% or more state-owned, the greater the …rm creation rate in high-tech sectors. This result would suggest that state-owned banks are willing to grant credit to new high-tech …rms, thus providing credit opportunity to riskier …rms that are, usually, not favored by banks. Instead, Foreign Bank Ownership is always not signi…cant.
Finally, the net impact of banking market structure on entrepreneurship is also estimated, varying the progress in transition stage and level of globalization (see Table  5 ). Globalization is positive and signi…cant, meaning that a higher level of globalization promotes the process of …rm creation since …rms can more easily get in touch with foreign lenders and also access to international …nancial markets. We add the interaction term Bank Concentration*Globalization with the aim to test whether the e¤ect of bank concentration di¤ers for more internationally integrated countries. However, such interaction appears to be not signi…cant. Privatization has a positive and sig-ni…cant impact, meaning that the transition from a planned toward a market-oriented economy stimulates the entrepreneurial initiative. Moreover, the interaction term Bank Concentration*Privatization is negative and signi…cant: the positive impact of banking concentration is lower for countries that have reached a greater progress in transition.
One might argue that the positive impact of concentrated banking sectors clashes with progress in the transition stage: lender-borrower cooperation stimulates the entrepreneurship, however, when countries make progress in the stage of transition and thus in the stage of economic development, the bene…ts of the bank-based system begin to shrink and even the banking sector needs to restructure and become more competitive.
Finally, in the bottom of each table, we report the results of tests performed. The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic, the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald statistic, is far greater than the critical values 11 , allowing us, therefore, strongly to reject the null of weakness of the instruments 12 . The results of the Hansen J test, which checks the validity of the instruments, fail to reject the null, thus the overidentifying restriction is valid for each regression.
Conclusions
This contribution …lls a gap in the literature by shedding light on the e¤ect that banking market structure has on the entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European transition countries.
We …nd evidence that bank concentration, up to a certain level, has fostered the entrepreneurial initiative during the period 2000-2007 through two channels.
From a microeconomic perspective, as Petersen and Rajan (1995) underline, banks with market power are more willing to engage in lending relationship with start-up …rms. The market power assures banks that the lower interest rates charged to startup …rms will be compensated through long-term pro…t sharing in the future when …rms are mature and pro…table.
From a macroeconomic perspective, giving some degree of market power to banks makes the entire sector more stable. In fact, instability in the banking system reverberates to other industries since banks address …nancial resources toward …rms.
These points are especially true for Central and Eastern European countries, characterized by bank-based …nancial systems in which …rms rely primarily on banking credit and do not have an e¤ective alternative source of funding. More concentrated banking markets are suitable for …nancing physical-asset-intensive industry rather than high-technology, R&D-based industries. Generally, physical-asset-intensive industries are traditional and well known, so the absence of market signals about their pro…tability does not cause problems in terms of investment decisions. When industries are intangible assets-based there is the need to improve transparency, thus bank-based system should become more competitive and, therefore, market-oriented.
The positive impact of concentration softens when countries move from a planned economy towards a more market-oriented one. The relationship-based concentrated system clashes with the characteristics of market-oriented economies that require a competitive banking system.
